Gettier Links

Check out these links to my other blog where I cover Gettier in detail:

http://philosophywithlouise.blogspot.com/#uds-search-results

Quine

Quine's polemic against the 'dogmas of empiricism' centers around the issue of what exactly it means to say that a statement is analytic.  Certain statements, like tautologies, are tautologies because the signs used are the same.  E.g, "All unmarried men are unmarried."  But a statement like "All bachelors are unmarried" is supposed to be analytic even though the signs differ.  So how is it that the statement is analytic?  Some appeal to the notion of synonymity.  Since 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonyms, then the sentence is analytic.  But how can we define synonymity without an appeal to a definition of analyticity?  If we say that two words are synonymous because they can be exchanged in every case with the same truth value preserved, this does not work for sentences like ""Bachelor"" has less than ten letters" and ""An unmarried man" has less than ten letters.  In order to know what really makes words synonymous, we need to first define analyticity.

Quine offers a holistic notion of language, according to which no statements are analytic.  All statements are subject to revision based on new empirical knowledge.  Some statements will be more integrated into systems of knowledge, but even those that are very foundational will be subject to revision.

Externalism and Extended Mind

Putnam points out that if we imagine Twin Earth, where 'water' is made up of XYZ molecules instead of H20 molecules, then the meaning of the word 'water' is different there than it is here.  Burge notes that if 'arthritis' meant inflammation in joints and other tissues in Twin Earth, then the belief "I have arthritis in my thigh" is true there even though it is false here.  Both these examples seem to indicate that the meanings of our words are not determined by what is going on inside our own minds.

Chalmers and Clark propose a theory that even your own cognition is not happening entirely in your own mind.  If there is something external to you that aids in a cognitive process, such as a calculator or a notebook, and if that thing is reliably coupled to you so that you can use it normally, then that external thing is part of your cognitive process and hence part of your mind.  

Millikan and Langer

Millikan's theory of meaning (or theory of intentionality) is the theory that things like the dance of a honeybee or the splash of a beaver's tail have meaning. The signs (the dance or the splash) have a fixed function that they serve. These signs are consumed by other bees and other beavers. The axis on which a bee dances corresponds to the direction in which nectar lies. The tempo at which a bee dances corresponds to the distance of the nectar. The bee can vary the dance to convey different meanings to other bees. To speak anthropomorphically (and hence metaphorically), the bee is telling the other bees where the nectar is and to go get it. A beaver splashing its tail tells other beavers that danger is coming and to take cover. 

Langer provides a theory of 'significance' for art.  She says that art is a symbol for human feelings.  Symbols differ from signs insofar as symbols convey a conception of something, or an idea.  Signs merely refer to an object.  Art forms are similar to languages because they have articulated forms of expression.  Art forms differ from languages because they have no fixed referents for their symbols.